Canberra, the Iran war reminds us that small strategic moves can quickly evolve into expanded military commitments. The United States decided to block Iranian ports by controlling access to the crucial Strait of Hormuz in response to Iran’s claims to control the strait – something the country has long threatened to do if attacked.
In its list of conditions for ending the war, Iran has demanded for the first time recognition of its sovereignty over the waterway, considered the world’s most important energy corridor.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s important maritime chokepoints: a strategic corridor through which large amounts of global trade pass within an extremely limited space.
Assuming that this type of action can be ended quickly and easily, there is often a heavy price to pay.
America’s allies might be wise to consider this history now – especially as the anniversary of the disastrous Battle of Gallipoli, which was fought to open the way to the Black Sea during World War I, approaches on April 25.
Gallipoli was about controlling sea lanes
By early 1915, Europe’s most powerful nations—including Britain and its empire—had been at war for months, with no end in sight. Keeping Britain and France’s ally Russia in the fight means providing them with a steady stream of ammunition and other critical war materiel.
The only realistic route was through the Ottoman-controlled Dardanelles Strait, which connected the Mediterranean and Black Seas between the Gallipoli Peninsula and Asia Minor.
Since the Ottoman Empire was already at war with Britain, France, and Russia, the Allies had to try to destroy Turkish resistance before they could force a breakthrough.
After months of discussions, the Allies decided on a purely naval operation: no army support was needed. This was largely the brainchild of Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty.
If the Royal Navy’s elite need to remain in home waters to deter the threat of the powerful German navy in the North Sea, outdated warships may prevail. The Allies concluded that the “sideshow” could be canceled at any time.
Other key government ministers and admirals, including the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for War, supported Churchill’s plan – or so it seemed. Privately, some have deep reservations.
Why failed?
Naval forces are protected from most land-based weapons while sailing in open water. However, when they are confined to a limited body of water, such as a maritime chokepoint, they become highly vulnerable to attack from land. An expensive warship can be damaged or destroyed by much cheaper land-based artillery.
British policymakers underestimated Türkiye’s defense capabilities and ignored unpalatable intelligence. After the outbreak of World War I, the Turkish army began to install heavy artillery on both sides of the strait and laid mines in the sea.
When the British and French fleets tried to clear the way with minesweepers, Turkish artillery opened fire on them, driving them away. Then, as the older battleships moved forward to knock out the cannon fire, they too came under fire and quickly fell victim to the failure to clear mines, losing nearly a third of the fleet.
As historian Jörn Leonhard writes: “The Turkish navy succeeded in blocking the Dardanelles with just a single minelayer.”
Things got worse. With Britain’s prestige now at stake, the Allies stepped up their efforts. On April 25, 1915, Allied ground forces intervened in an attempt to ultimately destroy the coastal defenses.
As historian John H. Morrow Jr. poignantly described: “There they would stay for the next eight months, enduring bloody attacks and counterattacks, with both sides launching ferocious suicide attacks on each other. Now the troops, strafed by shells, machine guns, and rifles, were engaged in frantic hand-to-hand combat, with men biting, punching, clubbing, and stabbing each other to death, all to no avail.”
Although outnumbered, the Turkish army still had the upper hand and was a formidable opponent. Allied and Turkish forces suffered approximately 483,000 casualties. The Allies were forced to retreat.
4 lessons in Gallipoli
1. Beware of the temptation of a dominant personality. Complex strategic decisions require extensive consultation and an evidence base that considers all key factors. Of course, at Gallipoli “they should have known better”. But the decisions are far more deliberate than the U.S. strategy used so far in attacking Iran, which some see as unstable.
2. Don’t fall into the trap of underestimating your enemy. “Gunboat diplomacy” didn’t work in 1915 and so far it doesn’t work in 2026. U.S. President Donald Trump may have been seduced by the ease of U.S. military action against Venezuela. But Washington greatly underestimated Tehran’s determination and strategic position.
3. Mission creep: Once initial resources prove insufficient, powerful states are likely to expand rather than scale back their efforts—the definition of the dreaded “mission creep.”
4. War causes casualties. This is often forgotten when calculating easy wins. Gallipoli inflicted horrific military casualties. The majority of casualties in current wars are civilians. If the conflict escalates, even with the ostensible control of commercial vessels at sea, more civilian casualties will occur.
Furthermore, we do not yet understand the scale of the damage caused by the wider economic costs of disrupting vital energy and fertilizer supplies, particularly in poorer parts of the world.
Australians have choice in Iran war
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Naval forces at sea chokepoints are more vulnerable than ever. The proliferation of cheap land-based systems such as drones and missiles means that traditionally weaker states – and even non-state actors – can effectively compete for sea lanes with the most expensive and most advanced militaries.
We should be as critical of the current war in Iran as we are of today’s Gallipoli campaign. It is unlikely to be solved anytime soon, and simply cannot be solved by military means alone.
The difference between 1915 and 2026 is that Australia is no longer automatically attracted to the interests of other countries. Now, sovereign Australia has the right to make its own decisions.
GSP
This article was generated from automated news agency feeds without modifications to the text.
